George's Reply 4/28/2009

Dear Susan,

I apologize for the delay in my response again. Life is busy! Thank you for our continued discussion.

I would like to address this paragraph from your latest post:

“I accept that the church has designated certain things under the definition that you have given as ‘intrinsic evil.’ And I would agree that intrinsic evils must be given greater weight – but not to the elimination of all other considerations.”

They must not simply be given greater weight. They must be given absolute priority. I’d like to illustrate the difference with a trivial example. Consider a man who is given a choice between a red shirt and several blue shirts. This man happens to like the color red, so he gives greater weight to it. If given the choice between a red shirt and three blue shirts, he would choose the red shirt, because he likes the color much better. However, if he is to choose between a red shirt and one hundred blue shirts, he would choose the blue shirts, because the deal is simply too great to ignore.

Now, another man is given the same choices, but he gives the red shirt absolute priority. In both cases, he chooses the single red shirt, because its value to him is priceless in comparison to even one million shirts.

In my analogy, the choice to vote against intrinsic evils is, of course, the red shirt. That does not mean that the blue shirts are worthless. However, given the choice between two goods – preventing the promulgation of intrinsic evils on one hand and feeding the poor/caring for the environment/stopping a questionable war on the other – an absolute priority must be given to preventing intrinsic evils.

That is why we may consider voting for a candidate who supports an intrinsic evil only if all other candidates do as well. In such a case, the absolute priority is no longer meaningful and a choice must be made based on minimizing the promulgation of intrinsic evil.

Susan, you and I live in difficult times. In an ideal world, we would always be given the choice between two upstanding, moral individuals, or at the very least individuals who do not support intrinsic evils. In such a case, both choices would be legitimate. But, we are not justified in voting for a candidate who supports intrinsic evils just because the pickin’s are slim. It doesn’t matter how inept the other candidates may be; we cannot turn our support to someone who supports intrinsically evil acts.

I would also like to mention again one other point. You never answered whether you would vote for Hitler if he were to run for office and the US had already legalized the killing of Jews. Admittedly, it is unfair to use the name of Hitler which has such a stigma, but if I rephrase the question, does it make it any easier?

Consider the following. What if the US had already legalized the killing of Jews, and it was occurring at an enormous rate – 4,000 deaths a day. In the upcoming election, two candidates are running for office. One candidate supports the killing of Jews and promises to enact a bill guaranteeing the slaughter for ages to come. That same candidate also happens to have great ideas about social reform. The other candidate’s ideas on social reform seem lacking. However, he is pro-Jew. He would certainly not expand the killing of Jews and would block any further expansion of such activities. Would you vote for the first candidate?

Would a pre-existing law allowing the killing of Jews have made the outcome of Hitler’s reign any better? The truth is, the Nazi regime was gravely immoral regardless of what came before it. Abortion is also a grave immorality. It matters not that the laws already existed or that the other candidate might not have done anything to stop abortion. When it comes down to it, one is voting for a man who approves of the killing of Jews/pre-born children, whether or not one approves of that action in itself.

Finally, as to where I see this in the bishops’ document, perhaps it will help to think of it this way. The document states “[W]hen all candidates hold a position in favor of an intrinsic evil, the conscientious voter faces a dilemma.” I would ask: What happens when at least one of the candidates does not hold a position in favor of an intrinsic evil? This statement implies that there would not be a dilemma. The dilemma arises only because all candidates hold a position in favor of an intrinsic evil. If there is no dilemma when one candidate does not favor an intrinsic evil, then obviously it is because of that candidate. He or she has suddenly become an easy option and therefore removed the dilemma.

I look forward to your response and our continued conversation.

God bless,
George